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A COMPELLING INTEREST? USING OLD
CONCEPTIONS OF PUBLIC HEALTH LAW TO
CHALLENGE THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT’S
CONTRACEPTIVE MANDATE
Joshua Joel*
INTRODUCTION
The history of public health law exposes the best and worst of
humanity. In this century, the Nazis justified genocide of millions to
advance public health.1 At the same time, efforts of public health
activists have saved millions from death and disease.2 Although
public health aims could arguably justify near-totalitarian
government control,3 governments have also used public health
powers to ensure healthier air to breathe, water to drink, and food to
eat.4 While personal liberties have been crushed through forced racist
segregation and sterilization on the platform of advancing public
health,5 similar curtailment of individual freedoms has saved nations
* J.D. Candidate, 2015, Georgia State University College of Law. I would like to extend a special
thank you to Dean Kelly Timmons for her support and guidance; to Professor Leslie Wolf for starting
me on this Note; to my wife—Sari—for the years of devotion as we have pursued our dreams; to my
children—Rochel, Yaakov, and Nachum—for their joy and love; to my parents for their relentless love
and support; and to the Creator for His endless blessings.
1. Virginia Leary et al., Health, Human Rights and International Law, 82 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.
PROC. 122, 134 (1990) (“The Nazis thought of the entire Nazi extermination program as a public health
problem. Killing became a ‘therapeutic imperative.’”); Robert N. Proctor, Nazi Medicine and Public
Health Policy, 10 DIMENSIONS 2 (1996), available at http://archive.adl.org/braun/dim_14_1_nazi_
med.asp (demonstrating that the Nazi worldview included a strong public health ethic, but “excluded
Jews and others deemed racially or genetically unfit from the . . . community,” thereby justifying murder
and torture by medical professionals).
2. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Achievements in Public Health, 1900–1999: Control of
Infectious Diseases, 48 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 621, 621–629 (1999), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm4829a1.htm.
3. See Mark A. Hall, The Scope and Limits of Public Health Law, 46 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED.
S199, S208 (2003).
4. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 2.
5. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205, 207 (1927) (upholding the forced sterilization of a “feebleminded white woman” who may produce “‘inadequate offspring’” as constitutional because the welfare
of society would be promoted); Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10, 12–13 (N.D. Cal. 1900) (challenging
the constitutionality of mandatory quarantine only enforced against Chinese people); Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537, 540 (1896) (sustaining state anti-miscegenation laws, segregation in railroad
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from disease through vaccination and quarantine.6 The study of
public health must center on the tension between government
coercive power and individual liberty.7
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) touts
“family planning” as one of the ten great public health achievements
of the twentieth century.8 Nevertheless, the availability of
contraception has long been at the center of political, social, and legal
controversy.9 On March 23, 2010, this controversy came to a head
when President Barack Obama signed the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (ACA or the Act).10
One of the Act’s provisions, referred to as the “HHS Mandate,”
requires health insurers to cover an essential benefits package,
including prescription drugs.11 The Act delegates authority to the
transportation, and segregated schools); Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the “Old” Public Health: The
Legal Framework for the Regulation of Public Health, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1421, 1424–25 (2004); Paul
A. Lombardo, Medicine, Eugenics, and the Supreme Court: From Coercive Sterilization to
Reproductive Freedom, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 4 (1996).
6. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31–32 n.† (1905) (showing evidence of the efficacy
of vaccination); Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Achievements in Public Health, 1900–1999
Impact of Vaccines Universally Recommended for Children—United States, 1990–1998, 48 MORBIDITY
& MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 243, 243–48 (1999), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/
mmwrhtml/00056803.htm (describing the impacts of recommended vaccination on the population);
Epstein, supra note 5, at 1445–47.
7. See LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 10–11 (2nd ed.
2008) (noting that protecting the community’s health is not possible without limiting many private
activities) [hereinafter GOSTIN, POWER].
8. Ten Great Public Health Achievements in the 20th Century, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Oct. 13, 2014, 7:38 PM), http://www.cdc.gov/about/history/tengpha.htm. Other
achievements include vaccination, motor-vehicle safety, safer workplaces, control of infectious diseases,
decline in deaths from heart disease and stroke, safer and healthier foods, fluoridation of water, and
public awareness of the hazards of tobacco use. Id. The CDC claims that decreased family size and
ability to space births has improved women’s role in society and contributed to the better health of the
family. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Achievements in Public Health, 1900–1999: Family
Planning, 48 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1073, 1073 (1999), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm4847a1.htm.
9. See Erica S. Mellick, Time for Plan B: Increasing Access to Emergency Contraception and
Minimizing Conflicts of Conscience, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 402, 405–11 (2006).
10. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010); Sheryl
Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, Obama Signs Health Care Overhaul Bill, With a Flourish, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 23, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/health/policy/24health.html; Robert Pear,
Contraceptives Stay Covered in Health Law, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/06/29/us/politics/final-rule-issued-for-contraceptive-coverage.html.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a) (2012) (requiring health insurers to provide minimum no-cost coverage
for “evidence-based” preventive services according to guidelines by United States Preventive Services
Task Force, CDC, and HHS). HHS delegated to the Institute of Medicine (IOM) the job of
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Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to determine what
prescription drugs the HHS Mandate includes.12 The HHS definition
embraces all FDA-approved preventive care drugs including
contraceptives such as Plan B (“morning-after pill”),13 Ella (“weekafter pill”),14 and two intrauterine devices (IUDs) that can prevent the
implantation of a fertilized egg.15 Employers who provide insurance
and do not comply with the mandate are subject to heavy fines.16
Strong objection by the Roman Catholic Church and other
religious groups prompted HHS to amend its guidelines and exempt
non-profit religious institutions from the provision.17 Nonetheless,
recommending guidelines for this purpose. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to
Coverage of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg.
8725, 8726 (proposed Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). IOM’s
report recommended the guidelines to include “‘[a]ll Food and Drug Administration [(FDA)] approved
contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for all women
with reproductive capacity.’” Id.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012) (“[W]ith respect to women, such additional preventive
care . . . as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources and Services
Administration”); 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv) (2013).
13. See Birth Control: Medicines to Help You, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
ForConsumers/ByAudience/ForWomen/FreePublications/ucm313215.htm (last updated Jan. 8, 2015).
14. See id.
15. 77 Fed. Reg. 8725; Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1123 (10th Cir. 2013)
(describing the contraceptives at issue).
16. See 26 U.S.C. § 4980D(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-36) (imposing a tax of “$100 for
each day in the noncompliance period with respect to each individual to whom such failure relates.”);
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775–76 (2014). (“For Hobby Lobby, the bill
could amount to $1.3 million per day or about $475 million per year; for Conestoga, the assessment
could be $90,000 per day or $33 million per year; and for Mardel, it could be $40,000 per day or about
$15 million per year.”).
17. 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(A) (2013); Coverage of Certain Preventative Services Under the
Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 8456, 8458 (Feb. 6, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 148,
and 156); Brady Sullivan, HHS Issues Another Rule on Contraceptive Mandate, REGBLOG (July 10,
2013),
http://www.law.upenn.edu/blogs/regblog/2013/07/10-sullivan-contraceptive-mandate.html
(indicating that outrage from “[r]eligious rights advocacy groups and the Catholic Church” caused HHS
to issue new rules “seeking to accommodate religious non-profits.”). Other religious groups—even those
not doctrinally opposed to contraception—have aligned themselves with the Catholic Church’s
objections because of the religious freedom implications. Howard Slugh, Rabbis Side with Catholics,
Urge Obama to Drop Mandate, WKLY. STANDARD (May 24, 2012, 12:19 PM),
http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/rabbis-side-catholics-urge-obama-drop-mandate_645819.html
(“Rabbinical Council of America (RCA), the largest organization of rabbis in the United States,
approved a resolution recognizing that the Health and Human Services . . . forces many employers to
‘violate the injunctions of their religion.’”); Timothy George & Chuck Colson, First They Came for the
Catholics: Obama’s Contraceptive Mandate, CHRISTIANITY TODAY (Feb. 8, 2012, 10:10 AM),
http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2012/februaryweb-only/catholics-contraceptive-mandate.html
(urging evangelicals to “stand unequivocally with our Roman Catholic brothers and sisters,” reasoning
that “when the government violates the religious liberty of one group, it threatens the religious liberty of
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religious groups were unsatisfied.18 As a result, over 126 non-profit
plaintiffs and 193 for-profit corporation plaintiffs filed lawsuits
challenging the mandate’s constitutionality.19 The circuit courts split
in the cases decided on their merits, and the cases were appealed to
the United States Supreme Court.20
In a landmark ruling, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the
Supreme Court held that closely held, for-profit corporations are
entitled to free-exercise rights, and a regulation restricting the
religious activities of a corporation must comply with the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).21 The Obama administration had
claimed that contraception coverage is a vital preventive care service
within the government’s coercive authority to advance public
health.22 Although the Burwell majority criticized this argument,23
the Court found it “unnecessary to adjudicate this issue” and assumed
all.”); Asma T. Uddin & Ashley McGuire, It’s About Religious Liberty, Not Birth Control, ONFAITH
(Mar. 7, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/altmuslimah/post/beyond-the-war-on-women-itsabout-religious-liberty-not-birth-control/2012/03/06/gIQAK5ArwR_blog.html (advocating Muslim
women to “stand united” with Catholic women “in opposition to the mandate and the affront on
religious freedom it so gravely poses” even though Islam disagrees with Catholic doctrine about
morality of contraception, sterilization, and abortifacients).
18. Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Religious Freedom and Women’s Health—The Litigation on
Contraception, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 4, 4 (2013). See also Press Release, United States Conference of
Catholic Bishops, HHS Final Rule Still Requires Action in Congress, By Courts, Says Cardinal Dolan
(July 3, 2013), available at http://www.usccb.org/news/2013/13-137.cfm.
19. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, 723 F.3d 1114; Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 724 F.3d 377 (3rd Cir. 2013), rev’d, Burwell; Korte v. Sebelius,
735 F.3d 654, 655 (7th Cir. 2013); HHS Mandate Information Central, http://www.becketfund.org/
hhsinformationcentral (last visited Sept. 16, 2013). In general, plaintiffs argue that requiring religious
employers to provide contraception against their religious beliefs violates their constitutional right to
free exercise of religion. Id.
20. See Hobby Lobby Stores, 723 F.3d at 1120 (holding that a for-profit corporation can assert a
free-exercise claim); Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 381 (holding that a for-profit, secular corporation cannot
engage in religious exercise); Gilardi v. HHS, 733 F.3d 1208, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (finding that
although secular corporations are not afforded free exercise rights, the contraceptive mandate
“trammels” the constitutional right to free exercise of religion of the shareholders); Korte, 735 F.3d at
686; Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618, 628 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that for-profit corporation
is not a “person” to engage in religion); Eden Foods Inc. vs. Sebelius, 733 F.3d 626, 633 (6th Cir. 2013)
(holding that a corporation could not assert a religious freedom claim).
21. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2775. See discussion infra Part III.D.
22. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *27–*28, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1536
(2014) (No. 13-354), 2013 WL 5290575, at *27–*28 (Sept. 19, 2013).
23. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2779 (“[M]any of these [interests] are couched in very broad terms, such
as promoting ‘public health’ and ‘gender equality.’ RFRA, however, contemplates a ‘more focused’
inquiry . . . .”).
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“that the interest in guaranteeing cost-free access to the four
challenged contraceptive methods is compelling within the meaning
of RFRA.”24
As demonstrated by Burwell, courts often do not to engage in
critical analysis of public health legal doctrine because cases can
often be resolved within a more formalistic legal framework.25 A
more rigorous public health analysis could provide a more
predictable framework by which courts could weigh the competing
interests implicated by public health legislation and regulation, as
well as provide tools to agencies to ensure the legality of their
actions. Additionally, it could serve to remove the politicization of
regulatory decision-making by vetting those actions within a
preconceived framework. Therefore, the purpose of this Note is to
suggest a framework by which public health initiatives should be
analyzed when they conflict with religious freedoms.26
Part I of this Note presents arguments for and against the notion
that mandating contraceptive coverage is an important public health
initiative.27 Part II defines and delineates the scope of public health.28
24. Id. at 2780, 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“It is important to confirm that a premise of the
Court’s opinion is its assumption that the HHS regulation here at issue furthers a legitimate and
compelling interest in the health of female employees.”). Conservative scholar, Richard A. Epstein, has
criticized this assumption as an “intellectual and tactical mistake.” See Richard A. Epstein, The Defeat
of the Contraceptive Mandate in Hobby Lobby: Right Results, Wrong Reasons, 2014 CATO SUP. CT.
REV. 35, 50 (2014).
25. See Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2780; WENDY E. PARMET, POPULATIONS, PUBLIC HEALTH, & THE
LAW 5–6 (2009) [hereinafter PARMET, POPULATIONS] (arguing that “despite the ubiquity of public
health issues in law,” theorists and courts overlook the “centrality of public health issues” in their
analysis and decisions, and do not appreciate the insight the field of public health may “bring to the
legal question at hand.”). The district courts that struck down the contraceptive mandate also only relied
on the fact that the government only provided general public health interests that were insufficient to
fulfill the “compelling interest” standard. See Hobby Lobby Stores, 723 F.3d at 1143 (holding that the
interests of public health and gender inequality are insufficient because they are too broadly
formulated); Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1220 (stating that the government’s public health “recitation is sketchy
and highly abstract”); Korte, 735 F.3d at 686 (holding that the government’s arguments “flunk the test”
because the interests were stated too generally). See also Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 412 (Jordan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Obama administration did not satisfy the RFRA because only general
health interests were asserted).
26. This Note does not, however, touch the primary controversy in the Burwell case: whether
corporations have religious freedom at all. See, e.g., Emily Carlton Cook, How the Meaning of
Incorporation over Time Lends Support for Corporate Free Exercise Rights, 48 GA. L. REV. 1149, 1154
(2014).
27. See discussion infra Part I.
28. See discussion infra Part II.
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Part III approaches public health in the legal context: first, it
delineates the federal government’s constitutional power to enforce
public health interests; second, it establishes a framework for
evaluating public health initiatives; and third, it presents the standard
by which courts balance public health interests against incursion on
freedom of religion.29 Finally, Part IV suggests that the Jacobson
factors presented in Part III should be used as a tool to assess whether
a compelling interest exists when the federal government enacts
legislation that restricts religious freedom, and analyzes the
contraceptive mandate to demonstrate the benefit of such an
analysis.30
I. THE POLICY DEBATE: IS MANDATORY CONTRACEPTIVE COVERAGE
THE APPROPRIATE PRESCRIPTION?
The underlying goal driving the ACA’s preventive care coverage
requirement is the effort to transform the healthcare system from one
that treats illness to one that sustains health.31 The ACA considers
contraception to be a part of basic preventive care for women and
therefore requires coverage without copayments.32 Mandating
contraceptive coverage is not new; before the ACA, twenty-eight
states had already required insurers to cover contraceptives, twenty of
which exempted certain employers and insurers.33
29. See discussion infra Part III.
30. See discussion infra Part IV.
31. Dana R. Gossett et al., Contraception Is a Fundamental Primary Care Service, 309 JAMA 1997,
1997 (2013); Jost, supra note 18, at 4 (noting that the preventive care chapters of the ACA reflect health
policy experts’ view that healthcare should proactively “prevent disease and preserve wellness”).
32. See 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8726; Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2787–88 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Adam
Sonfield, The Case for Insurance Coverage of Contraceptive Services and Supplies Without Cost
Sharing, GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV., Winter 2011, at 7, 7, available at http://www.guttmacher.org/
pubs/gpr/14/1/gpr140107.pdf (claiming that “a strong, long-standing body of evidence” shows that
contraception has long been considered part of preventive public health care).
33. State Policies in Brief: Insurance Coverage of Contraceptives, GUTTMACHER INST. 2 (Oct.
2014), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_ICC.pdf. Three states limit contraceptive
coverage refusals to churches and church associations but not hospitals or other entities. Id. Seven states
expand coverage refusals to include churches, church associations, religious schools, and some religious
charities and universities. Id. Nine others allow all religious organizations to refuse to provide coverage,
including some hospitals. Id. At least one of these states exempts even secular organizations with “moral
or religious” objections. Id. The federal mandate contains a “religious employer” exception and defines
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A. Arguments in Favor of the Contraceptive Mandate
Contraceptive mandates originated as a women’s rights issue, but
proponents also argue that mandates provide “direct, positive” effects
on improving the health of women and infants.34 The primary use of
contraception is to prevent pregnancy.35 The rate of unintended
pregnancies in the United States is higher than in other developed
countries,36 particularly among low-income women, women in their
teens and early twenties, and minorities.37 One way to minimize
unintended pregnancies is to expand access to contraceptive care.38
Therefore, mandate supporters argue that preventing unwanted
pregnancies is an important public health initiative.39

it as a nonprofit organization that “primarily employs persons who share the religious tenets of the
organization,” “serves primarily persons who share the religious tenets of the organization,” and whose
purpose is to inculcate “religious values.” 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(B) (2013). The federal
exemption is modeled after those of California, New York, and Oregon, which are the narrowest of all
the state exemptions. Six Things Everyone Should Know About the HHS Mandate, U.S. CONF. OF
CATHOLIC BISHOPS (Feb. 6, 2012), http://www.usccb.org/news/2012/12-021.cfm.
34. BEBE J. ANDERSON & LYNNE S. WILCOX, Reproductive Health, in LAW IN PUBLIC HEALTH
PRACTICE 348, 363 (Richard A. Goodman et al. eds., 2003); Sonfield, supra note 32, at 8 (stating that the
“most direct, positive effects” of helping couples plan pregnancy are improved “maternal and child
health outcomes”). Arguments in favor of contraceptive mandates gained traction in the mid-1990’s
after insurance companies began providing coverage for Viagra for men. Susan J. Stabile, State Attempts
to Define Religion: The Ramifications of Applying Mandatory Prescription Contraceptive Coverage
Statutes to Religious Employers, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 741, 741 (2005). Women’s rights groups
argued that providing coverage for contraception would balance the inequality of access to reproductive
health services. Lisa A. Hayden, Gender Discrimination Within the Reproductive Health Care System:
Viagra v. Birth Control, 13 J.L. & HEALTH 172–73 (1999). In fact, the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ruled that employers’ failure to provide equal coverage to prescription drugs
to men and women violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Anderson & Wilcox, supra at 363 no. i.
35. Gossett et al., supra note 31, at 1997.
36. Id. (citing Susheela Singh et al., Unintended Pregnancy: Worldwide Levels, Trends, and
Outcomes, 41 STUD. FAM. PLAN. 241, 241–50 (2010)). Unwanted pregnancies are defined as those that
occur two or more years earlier than desired or those that are not wanted at all. Susheela Singh et al.,
supra, at 242 (2010). It is estimated that there are over 3 million unintended pregnancies in the United
States annually. Gossett et al., supra note 31, at 1997 (citing Singh et al., supra, at 241–50).
37. Lawrence B. Finer & Stanley K. Henshaw, Disparities in Rates of Unintended Pregnancies in
the United States, 1994 and 2001, 38 PERSP. ON SEXUAL AND REPROD. HEALTH 90, 92–94 (2006)
(demonstrating by empirical evidence that these groups have the most unintended pregnancies).
38. Singh et al., supra note 36, at 248 (suggesting based upon epidemiological data that increased
access to contraceptive use decreases unintended pregnancy rates).
39. Gossett et al., supra note 31, at 1997.
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1. The Problem: The Effects of Unintended Pregnancy
In its report, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) based its
recommendation on the argument that “unintended pregnancies have
adverse health consequences for both mothers and children.”40
Maternal mortality and risks associated with pregnancy are higher in
unplanned pregnancies.41 The IOM found that consequences of
unplanned pregnancies include inadequate prenatal care, depression,
higher likelihood of smoking or consuming alcohol during
pregnancy, and increased likelihood of preterm birth and low birth
weight.42 Contraception also lowers abortion rates.43 The report
further found that spacing pregnancies decreases the risk for adverse
pregnancy outcomes and allows for women with chronic medical
conditions to delay conception.44
Additionally, supporters urge that availability of contraception also
provides non-contraceptive medical benefits.45 For example, women
use contraceptives to treat menstrual disorders and even acne;
contraceptive pills have also been known to reduce the risk of
ovarian and endometrial cancer.46 Lastly, supporters argue that
40. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1536 (2014)
(No. 13-354), 2013 WL 5290575, at *6 (Sept. 19, 2013).
41. Gossett et al., supra note 31, at 1997. The specific argument is that the risk of death from oral
contraceptive use is only 1 in 1,667,000, “roughly the same risk as being struck by lightning,” whereas
15 of 100,000 women die in childbirth. Id.
42. INST. OF MED, COMM. ON PREVENTIVE SERVS. FOR WOMEN, CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES
FOR WOMEN: CLOSING THE GAPS 103 (2011), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?
record_id=13181. Contrary to the IOM report and the Guttmacher Institute’s arguments, studies in the
United States indicate that although most women who become pregnant unintentionally delay antenatal
care, once the pregnancy is discovered there is little discrepancy between intended and unintended
pregnancies. Jessica D. Gipson et al., The Effects of Unintended Pregnancy on Infant, Child, and
Parental Health: A Review of the Literature, 39 STUD. FAM. PLAN. 18, 22–23 (2008). Additionally,
many studies exist regarding the effect of unintended pregnancy on the risk of “congenital anomalies,
spontaneous abortion, premature delivery, and low birth weight,” and the studies have produced mixed
results. Id. at 24. A few studies in developed countries have found a correlation between unintended
pregnancies and “maternal risk behaviors, including alcohol and illicit drug use, cigarette smoking, and
caffeine intake.” Id. at 21. But, three “large, rigorous” studies in the United States found that maternal
risk behaviors are not effected by pregnancy intention. Id. at 22.
43. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40, at 7.
44. INST. OF MED., supra note 42, at 103.
45. Gossett et al., supra note 31, at 1997.
46. INST. OF MED., supra note 42, at 107; Gossett et al., supra note 31, at 1997 (listing
“menorrhagia, dysmenorrhea, and chronic pelvic pain” among the non-pregnancy ailments often treated
with contraceptive pills).
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women receive social benefits from contraceptive use; pregnancy
planning frees women to pursue higher education, professional
opportunities, and financial security before establishing a family.47
2. The Solution: Easier and Cheaper Access to Contraceptive
Care
Proponents of the contraceptive mandate argue that providing nocost contraceptive care is the best way to address the problem of
unwanted pregnancies.48 They point to statistics showing that
increased contraceptive use parallels declines in unintended
pregnancy and abortion.49 Also, improved access to contraceptives
through expanded family planning programs in states like California
and Arkansas precipitated a sharp decline in abortions and
unintended pregnancies.50 The argument is that reducing cost will
instigate greater usage of the most common and effective
contraceptives, the pill and sterilization, and therefore the number of
unintended pregnancies will decline.51
B. Arguments Against the Contraceptive Mandate
The mandate’s opponents attack this chain of reasoning and
suggest that contraceptive mandates are ineffective in the face of the
“unique qualities of the sexual transaction,” and that easy access to
contraception may potentially increase unwanted pregnancy by
increasing the demand for sex outside of marriage.52 Further, the
mandate’s opponents argue that the mandate will likely do little to
47. Gossett et al., supra note 31, at 1997–98 (arguing non-medical benefits of contraception).
48. Sonfield, supra note 32, at 7 (arguing that contraceptive coverage is a low-cost way of
addressing the “daunting barrier” low-income women face in accessing contraception).
49. INST. OF MED., supra note 42, at 105; Sonfield, supra note 32, at 8 (claiming increased
contraceptive use is responsible for a seventy-seven percent decline in pregnancies among 15–17 year
olds from 1995 to 2002).
50. Sonfield, supra note 32, at 8. In California, 2,870,000 unintended pregnancies and 118,000
abortions were avoided. Id. Arkansas saw an eighty-four percent drop in repeat births within twelve
months. Id.
51. INST. OF MED., supra note 42, at 108–09.
52. Helen M. Alvaré, No Compelling Interest: The “Birth Control” Mandate and Religious
Freedom, 58 VILL. L. REV. 379, 380 (2013) [hereinafter Alvaré, No Compelling Interest].
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decrease unwanted pregnancies because low-income women, who
represent the highest number of unwanted pregnancies, are already
“amply supplied with free or low-cost contraception” by state and
federal governments.53 Women’s failure to access this contraception
indicates that their reasons for not using contraceptives have less to
do with cost than with other factors that are not affected by the
mandate.54
Perhaps the most salient argument against the contraceptive
mandate is that its sole basis, the IOM report, is flawed.55 First,
throughout its treatment of statistical evidence, the report fails to
prove causation between unwanted pregnancy and health problems
and does “no more than suggest correlation.”56 In fact, the reality
might be the reverse; it is highly plausible that a woman’s
predisposition to risk-taking accounts for both unintended
pregnancies and problems such as smoking and drinking during
pregnancy.57 Opponents also argue that increased access to oral
contraception may even damage women’s health because some
53. Id. Alvaré notes that most low-income women already have access to contraception through
Medicaid and other government programs and fail to use it. Id. at 425. See also 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396d(a)(4)(C) (including “family planning” as a Medicaid benefit for women of child-bearing age
who are sexually active).
54. Alvaré, No Compelling Interest, supra note 52, at 380.
55. Id. at 391 (arguing that the IOM report’s conclusions are flawed and cannot support the
government’s claim, and pointing out that the IOM furnished nearly the entire basis of the mandate).
Alvaré, in a separate article, asserts that the report was “crafted by hard-line ideological partisans,” who
were “pre-committed to the results they ultimately advocated,” and only heard from witnesses who
“were similarly ideologically committed.” Helen Alvaré, Bad Science and Failed Freedom Protections
in the HHS Mandate, PUB. DISCOURSE (Feb. 5, 2013), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com
/2013/02/7847. Catholic hospitals, the largest nonprofit health care provider in the United States, were
not invited to testify. Id. Indeed, one of the primary studies relied upon in the IOM was crafted by a
senior fellow of the Guttmacher Institute, an affiliate of Planned Parenthood, who is a longtime
supporter of large-scale birth control and abortion. Alvaré, No Compelling Interest, supra note 52, at
399.
56. Alvaré, No Compelling Interest, supra note 52, at 393. In fact, the actual texts of the studies cited
by the IOM only claim “association” and do not assert causation at all. Id. at 393. See also supra note
42. Sources cited in the report are irrelevant to claims asserted, and at least one of the primary statistical
studies used have been negatively peer reviewed. Alvaré, No Compelling Interest, supra note 52, at 393.
The report cites a study about gestational diabetes and cardiovascular disease to support an assertion
about low birth weight in children. Id. One review of a study used stated that it was based on
“questionable assumptions” and the numbers “may be considerably inflated.” Id. at 396 (citing Austin L.
Hughes, The Case for a Compelling Government Interest in the HHS Mandate: Examining the Scientific
Evidence (Dec. 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)).
57. Alvaré, No Compelling Interest, supra note 52, at 414.
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studies have shown that increased access to contraception has
increased the rates of sexually transmitted diseases.58 Regarding
children’s health, opponents argue better protection is afforded by
“encouraging mothers to seek prenatal care, breastfeed, and avoid
smoking and drinking during pregnancy” and not by preventing
births.59
Second, even assuming the IOM’s report is methodologically
sound, opponents question the argument that access to contraception
can reduce unwanted pregnancy.60 The government can merely
provide access, but cannot force a woman to use contraception.61 In
fact, women do not use contraception for many reasons, many of
which are not cost-related.62 For example, studies have shown that
the perception of low risk for pregnancy is the primary reason for not
using birth control.63 The IOM itself, in both 1995 and 2010, claimed
that “despite the availability of safe and effective preventive
methods,” there was little progress in preventing unwanted
pregnancy.64
Although there are unquestionably two sides to the policy coin
regarding the contraceptive mandate, it is insufficient to rely on
policy alone in determining whether a public health action is an
appropriate use of government coercive power.65 For that purpose,

58. Id. at 414–15.
59. Id. at 392. The United States Preventive Task Force, a panel of experts that research preventative
health measure, already requires these services to be provided to the insured cost-free. Id. (citing 42
U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2006)).
60. Id. at 396 (analyzing and criticizing each step of the logic supporting the HHS mandate).
61. Id. at 398.
62. Id. at 383–84. One study, for example, found that over seventy-five percent of women did not
use contraception because they “did not expect to have sex” or “did not think they could get pregnant.”
William Mosher et al., Predictors of Non-use of Contraception, and Reasons for Non-use: Key Factors
Affecting Unintended Pregnancy in the United States, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS 9, available
at http://paa2012.princeton.edu/papers/122088.
63. Mosher, supra note 62, at 9. Another study showed that simple ambivalence about pregnancy is
strongly connected to non-use of contraception. Jennifer J. Frost et al., Factors Associated with
Contraceptive Use and Nonuse, United States, 2004, 39 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 90, 97
(2007).
64. Alvaré, No Compelling Interest, supra note 52, at 400 (internal citation omitted).
65. See PARMET, POPULATIONS, supra note 25, at 28–45 (discussing the centrality of law to the
public health debate).
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attention must be given to the limitations and scope of public health
in a legal framework.
II. THE DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF PUBLIC HEALTH
“Public health” is a challenging concept to define, and an effort to
encapsulate its entire spectrum is difficult.66 Charles-Edward A.
Winslow, an early public health scholar, defined public health as “the
science and art of preventing disease, prolonging life, and promoting
physical health and efficiency through organised community
efforts.”67 While the medical care system treats individual patients,
the public health system’s “patient” is the entire community, focusing
on the wellbeing of a population.68
Additionally, the breadth of how “health” is defined greatly affects
the question of whether an initiative appropriately reaches public
health aims.69 The narrowest view of public health focuses on “the
immediate risk factors for injury and disease.”70 This definition limits
public health to government intervention, specifically public officials
“taking appropriate measures pursuant to specific legal
authority . . . to protect the health of the public.”71 It also limits
public
health
duties
to
“discrete
powers
such
as
surveillance . . . injury
prevention . . . and
infectious
disease

66. Id. at 7 (“Despite the frequent use of the term public health, the phrase is surprisingly difficult to
define.”); PUBLIC HEALTH LAW & ETHICS 1–8 (Lawrence O. Gostin, ed., 2nd ed. 2010) [hereinafter
PUBLIC HEALTH LAW & ETHICS]; Lawrence O. Gostin et al., The Law and the Public’s Health, in LAW
IN PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE 3, 4 (Richard A. Goodman et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter Gostin, Public’s
Health] (“The effort to capture the entire spectrum of public health activity in one definition is bound to
be complex and challenging.”); Mark A. Rothstein, Rethinking the Meaning of Public Health, 30 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 144, 144–47 (2002) (advancing three alternative definitions of public health).
67. ROBERT BEAGLEHOLE & RUTH BONITA, PUBLIC HEALTH AT THE CROSSROADS: ACHIEVEMENTS
AND PROSPECTS 174 (2nd ed. 2004) (quoting Charles-Edward A. Winslow).
68. Gostin, Public’s Health, supra note 66, at 5; PARMET, POPULATIONS, supra note 25, at 8. For
example, to address the serious public health concerns of cigarette smoking, the medical-care system
treats and counsels individuals regarding lung cancer, emphysema, and heart disease, whereas a public
health approach focuses on changing social norms and preventing tobacco addiction. Gostin, Public’s
Health, supra note 66, at 4.
69. PARMET, POPULATIONS, supra note 25, at 7–9.
70. PUBLIC HEALTH HAW & ETHICS, supra note 66, at 3.
71. Rothstein, supra note 66, at 146.
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control.”72 A more expansive view focuses on the general health of
the population, and enlists the community as a whole—both private
and public sectors—in the effort.73 This view focuses on the
“empirical and ethical relationship between the health of individuals
and the well-being of their communities.”74
The World Health Organization views public health more
expansively as a “state of complete physical, mental, and social wellbeing,” which broadens the horizon of public health initiatives to
cover virtually any program to promote human happiness.75
However, according to the dictionary definition of health—”the state
of being sound in body or mind” 76—only those initiatives that
promote the proper and efficient functioning of people’s mental or
physical health are justified.77 Even according to this slightly
narrower definition, however, public health could arguably be viewed
to include any initiative that creates an environment more conducive
to healthy living.78
Finally, the most expansive definition focuses on the
“socioeconomic foundations of health” and human rights.79
According to this view, public health may reach such social issues as
distribution of wealth, war, racial equality, civic duties, and lifestyle,
72. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW & ETHICS, supra note 66, at 3–4.
73. PARMET, POPULATIONS, supra note 25, at 14; Rothstein, supra note 66, at 145.
74. PARMET, POPULATIONS, supra note 25, at 14.
75. Id. at 7–8 (observing that WHO’s definition “equate[s] health with the totality of human
happiness,” and inferring from that definition that public health would “necessarily encompass an
extremely broad set of activities, including all collective actions undertaken to provide the conditions for
human happiness”) See also WORLD HEALTH ORG., Constitution of the World Health Organization 1,
http://www.who.int/governance/eb/who_constitution_en.pdf (defining public health).
76. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1043 (1986).
77. See PARMET, POPULATIONS, supra note 25, at 7–8 (demonstrating that the dictionary definition
of “health” affects the understanding of the scope of public health). The United States Supreme Court
took this limited dictionary-definition view of public health to interpret and limit the scope of
environmental regulation, and blatantly rejected the view that public health referred to “preventive
medicine, organized care of the sick, etc.” Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 465–66
(2001) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court rather interpreted public health to simply mean “the health
of the public.” Id. at 466.
78. PARMET, POPULATIONS, supra note 25, at 8 (noting that according to the IOM’s definition,
public health translates to what we do to “ensure the conditions for people’s bodies” to perform
properly). But see Epstein, supra note 5, at 1425–26 (arguing for a far more limited definition of public
health, which focuses on prevention of only those “public bads” that can be inflicted on another with
consent); Hall, supra note 3, at S208 (limiting public health to the more “traditional” approach).
79. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW & ETHICS, supra note 66, at 4; Rothstein, supra note 66, at 144.
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because they are “important factors in individual well-being and
community functioning.”80
III. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: THE LIMITATIONS OF GOVERNMENT
AUTHORITY AND REACH
“Critical elements” by which public health objectives are achieved
are government legislation and regulation.81 Therefore, the public
health system falls into inevitable contact—and sometimes conflict—
with the legal system.82 For example, mandatory vaccinations prevent
and diagnose outbreak of disease, but implicate rights to personal
autonomy, bodily integrity, or religious freedom.83 Similarly,
prohibitions against public smoking prevent personal injury, but
implicate freedom of association.84 Even emissions-control or other
environmental regulation may promote a healthy habitat for human
life, but can encroach on individual property rights.85
The Framers viewed the government’s duty to protect the health
and welfare of the public as one of its primary purposes in its
responsibility to advance the common good of its citizens,86 but they
80. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW & ETHICS, supra note 66, at 4. This last view is gaining popularity, and
public health practitioners have even used it to justify involvement in city planning, safe housing, diet,
exercise, violence, war, and racial discrimination. Id.
81. Stephen L. Isaacs, Where the Public Good Prevailed, 12 AM. PROSPECT, no. 10, June 2001,
available at http://prospect.org/article/where-public-good-prevailed.
82. Gostin, Public’s Health, supra note 66, at 3.
83. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905) (holding a mandatory vaccination statute
to be constitutional even though the plaintiff argued that vaccinations violated his religious principles
and personal autonomy); GOSTIN, POWER, supra note 7, at 44.
84. See Am. Legion Post #149 v. Wash. State Dep’t of Health, 192 P.3d 306, 324–25 (Wash. 2008)
(holding that restricting individuals’ freedom to smoke in private facility to enhance the public health
does not interfere with freedom of association because smoking is not a fundamental right or liberty);
Tucson v. Grezaffi, 23 P.3d 675, 681 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that ordinance forbidding public
smoking in restaurants did not violate an individual’s right to freedom of association and was
constitutional because it was a rational, legitimate means of safeguarding the general health, safety, and
welfare of the community); GOSTIN, POWER, supra note 7, at 44.
85. GOSTIN, POWER, supra note 7, at 46. See also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1019 (1992) (holding that legislation constitutes an unconstitutional taking when it causes an individual
to sacrifice all beneficial use of the land for the sake of the common good); Terry W. Frazier, Protecting
Ecological Integrity Within the Balancing Function of Property Law, 28 ENVTL. L. 53, 53 (1998) (noting
the tension between ecologically-based property rules and property law values).
86. See U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We . . . , in order to . . . promote the general Welfare . . . do ordain and
establish this Constitution”); Wendy E. Parmet, Health Care and the Constitution: Public Health and
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also inculcated profound protections of personal liberty in the
Constitution.87 Therefore, typical public health law discussion seeks
to ascertain the balance between positive power of government to act
on behalf of its citizens’ health and restraining that power to protect
individual rights, liberty, and freedom.88
A. States’ Power to Mandate Public Health Initiatives
It has long been settled that regulation and legislation to protect the
public health falls under the traditional state police powers.89 The
police powers refer to government authority to limit or even
eliminate certain private interests to promote comfort, health, morals,
or prosperity, as embodied in the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas, which means “use your property in such a manner as not to
injure that of another.”90 Discretion is afforded to the sovereign to
the Role of the State in the Framing Era, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 267, 270 (1992) (arguing that “[t]he
framing generation assumed that governments had a significant role to play in protecting health and
providing care to the ill,” and that the framers saw “that governments were empowered to protect and,
therefore, legitimate only when they protected the public health.”).
87. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
88. PARMET, POPULATIONS, supra note 25, at 31. Lawrence Gostin, a preeminent scholar on public
health law, offers a nuanced definition of public health law reflecting the values of law:
Public health law is the study of the legal powers and duties of the state, in collaboration
with its partners . . . to ensure the conditions for people to be healthy . . . and of the
limitations on the power of the state to constrain for the common good the autonomy,
privacy, liberty, proprietary, and other legally protected interests of individuals. The
prime objective of public health law is to pursue the highest possible level of physical
and mental health in the population, consistent with the values of social justice.
GOSTIN, POWER, supra note 7, at 4.
89. Cf. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 203 (1824) (referring to the police powers as “that immense
mass of legislation, which embraces every thing within the territory of a State . . . all which can be most
advantageously exercised by the States themselves. Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of
every description . . . are component parts of this mass.”); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25
(1905) (holding that “the police power of a state must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable
regulations established directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public health and the public
safety”).
90. Gostin, Public’s Health, supra note 66, at 14. However, the Supreme Court has consistently
refused to impose an affirmative duty on government to protect the health of its citizens. See Town of
Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005) (finding that a state mandatory arrest statute did not
impose an affirmative duty on the police to arrest); DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
489 U.S. 189, 191 (1989) (holding that the government had no affirmative duty to protect a child from
an abusive father even though the social services department knew of the abusive relationship and failed
to take steps to prevent further injury); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 507 (1989)
(rejecting a claim that government had obligation to provide health services stating that “[o]ur cases
have recognized that the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to government aid,
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determine what is unhealthy and how to regulate it, but that power is
limited by constitutional protections of individual liberty.91
B. Federal Government’s Powers Under the Commerce Clause
The federal government’s primary power to promote public health
stems from the Commerce Clause.92 Initially, public health powers
fell exclusively to the states as a result of a narrower understanding
of the Commerce Clause.93 Since the early 1900’s, however, the
Supreme Court has interpreted the Commerce Clause broadly,
thereby giving Congress the authority to regulate virtually every
activity that has a “substantial and harmful effect” on interstate
commerce.94 This has enabled Congress to usurp many traditional
state police powers.95
In recent cases, however, the Supreme Court has limited the scope
of the Commerce Clause to those activities that are inherently
even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the
government itself may not deprive the individual.”) (quoting Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 196).
91. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 25; Gostin, Public’s Health, supra note 66, at 15. Constitutional limits on
public health police powers will be developed infra Part II.C.
92. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; PUBLIC HEALTH LAW & ETHICS, supra
note 66, at 118. Additionally, the government may influence healthy behavior using tax relief to
encourage healthy activity and tax burdens to discourage risky behavior. Gostin, Public’s Health, supra
note 66, at 13. See also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205, 211–12 (1987) (holding that Congress
may condition receipt of tax funds on states enacting drinking-age legislation to promote the general
health and welfare). Also, Congress may enforce the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth civil rights
amendments to promote scientific progress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. amends. XIII,
XIV, XV. It also gives the President power to make treaties with other nations. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2,
cl. 2. All of these activities can be used in the advancement of public health aims. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW
& ETHICS, supra note 66, at 118 (describing the various ways Congress may promote public health).
93. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 203, 205–06 (emphasizing that quarantine and inspection laws are health
laws and not commerce, and are the exclusive power of the states); Epstein, supra note 5, at 1431–32.
94. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257–58 (1964) (holding Title II of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, outlawing discrimination in the hospitality industry, to be constitutional
even though it legislated “moral wrongs” because of the “disruptive effect that racial discrimination has
had on commercial intercourse”); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 123–24, 125, 127–28 (1942)
(upholding regulation imposing wheat growth quotas on an individual not growing for sale because “his
contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated” effects interstate commerce in a
way that “is far from trivial”); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 31–32 (1937)
(construing the National Labor Relations Act as constitutional because it governed activities “affecting”
interstate commerce); Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 190, 189–90, 196 (defining commerce to mean “intercourse
between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches,” and holding that Congressional power to
regulate that commerce “may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other
than are prescribed in the constitution”).
95. GOSTIN, POWER, supra note 7, at 105.
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economic even if enacted to promote a social cause, but not to social
or moral activities.96 Therefore, Congressional action to promote
public health falls under the authority of the Commerce Clause as
long as Congress purports to regulate an “economic endeavor.”97
C. Early Limitation of Government Authority: Jacobson v.
Massachusetts
The turn of the nineteenth century marked the rise of public health
consciousness in America.98 During that time, public health
departments were professionalized and the menacing threat of
infectious diseases began to abate.99 Meanwhile, debate over
compulsory vaccination raged in the media and in the state courts.100
The United States Supreme Court stepped into the fray and handed
down the most influential decision in public health law: Jacobson v.

96. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (holding that the Gun Free School Zones act
exceeded Congressional authority because it had “nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of
economic enterprise” and is “not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity”); United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609–11 (2000) (striking the civil remedy provision of the Violence
Against Women Act because gender-motivated crimes are not activities of an “economic nature” even
though they may have economic consequences).
97. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609–11; GOSTIN, POWER, supra note 7, at 105–06. The enactment of the
1906 Pure Food and Drug Act, the precursor to the 1938 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which
created the FDA, was premised on Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. George W. Evans
& Arnold I. Friede, The Food and Drug Administration’s Regulation of Prescription Drug
Manufacturer Speech: A First Amendment Analysis, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 365, 373–74 (2003).
98. PARMET, POPULATIONS, supra note 25, at 38 (describing the turn of the nineteenth century as the
“zenith” of public health’s influence and citing examples).
99. Id. (describing the professionalization of public health departments and its impact on infections
disease, and the “epidemiological transition” in which chronic diseases such as cancer and coronary
heart disease replaced infectious diseases as a major cause of death).
100. GOSTIN, POWER, supra note 7, at 122. Anti-vaccination activists called compulsory smallpox
vaccinations the “greatest crime of the age” which “slaughter[s] tens of thousands of innocent children.”
Id. (quoting Vaccine is a Crime: Porter Cope of Philadelphia, Claims It Is the Only Cause of Smallpox,
WASH. POST, July 29, 1905). The mainstream press called the debate “a conflict between intelligence
and ignorance, civilization and barbarism” and labeled anti-vaccinationists “familiar species of crank.”
Id. (quoting Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1885 and The Anti-Vaccinationists’ Triumph, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 18, 1898). Additionally, the state courts were “heavily engaged in the vaccination controversy”
even prior to Jacobson. Id.
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Massachusetts.101 The genesis of American public health law,
Jacobson enlightens debate to this day.102
In an effort to combat a smallpox outbreak, the city of Cambridge,
Massachusetts, acting on expressed statutory authority, enacted a
regulation requiring all citizens to receive the smallpox vaccine.103 A
local Lutheran pastor, Henning Jacobson, whose minority religion
influenced his alignment with anti-vaccination groups, refused free
vaccination.104 He was criminally charged and fined five dollars.105
Jacobson challenged his conviction in Massachusetts courts asserting
that “a compulsory vaccination law is unreasonable, arbitrary, and
oppressive, and, therefore, hostile to the inherent right of every
freeman to care for his own body and health in such way as to him
seems best . . . .”106 The Massachusetts court ruled against him,
101. See generally Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). See also PARMET, POPULATIONS,
supra note 25, at 38 (describing Jacobson as the Supreme Court’s “most important case concerning a
core public health law”).
102. See Wendy E. Parmet, Richard A. Goodman, & Amy Farber, Individual Rights Versus the Public
Health—100 Years After Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 652, 652, 654 (2005)
[hereinafter Parmet, Individual Rights] (arguing that physicians, policymakers, and public health
officials should consider lessons learned from Jacobson when using law to promote public health such
as the importance of considering the different views of diverse social groups to gain widespread
acceptance for public health intervention). See also Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 970–72 (2000)
(Kennedy, J. dissenting) (citing Jacobson to argue that the legislature only need show common belief of
medical knowledge to justify “tak[ing] sides in a medical debate” about partial birth abortions); Boone
v. Boozman, 217 F.Supp.2d 938, 955–56 (E.D. Ark. 2002) (using Jacobson’s holding to uphold a
mandatory vaccination statute and holding that Jacobson is relevant even according to modern
substantive due process doctrine until otherwise overruled by the Supreme Court).
103. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 12. The statute provided: “[T]he board of health of a city or town, if, in its
opinion, it is necessary for the public health or safety, shall require and enforce the vaccination and
revaccination of all the inhabitants thereof, and shall provide them with the means of free vaccination.”
Id. The Cambridge regulation stated:
Whereas, smallpox has been prevalent to some extent in the city of Cambridge, and still
continues to increase; and whereas, it is necessary for the speedy extermination of the
disease that all persons not protected by vaccination should be vaccinated; and whereas,
in the opinion of the board, the public health and safety require the vaccination or
revaccination of all the inhabitants of Cambridge; be it ordered, that all the inhabitants
habitants [sic] of the city who have not been successfully vaccinated since March 1st,
1897, be vaccinated or revaccinated.
Id. at 12–13.
104. Parmet, Individual Rights, supra note 102, at 653 (noting that Jacobson’s minority religious
status may have played a role in his disagreement with the Board of Health, and suggesting that doctors’
discriminatory attitudes toward “Italians, negroes and other employees” undermined public trust in the
vaccination program).
105. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 12–13.
106. Id. at 26.
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finding that the enactment advanced the public health in a way that
was not arbitrary or capricious and was within the state’s
constitutional power.107 In affirming the lower court’s ruling, Justice
Harlan created the legal framework by which public health initiatives
are evaluated.108
Lawrence O. Gostin distilled the analysis into five standards:
necessity, proportionality, harm avoidance, fairness, and most
importantly, reasonable means.109
1. Necessity
Justice Harlan emphasized that state police powers are authorized
only if necessary to the case.110 He notes that a community may use
means to protect itself which “might be exercised in particular
circumstances and in reference to particular persons in such an
arbitrary, unreasonable manner, or might go so far beyond what was
reasonably required for the safety of the public, as to authorize or
compel the courts to interfere for the protection of such persons.”111
Therefore, government can only compel behavior if it is acting “in
the face of a demonstrable health threat.”112 However, the Court only
requires “what the people believe is for the common welfare must be
accepted as tending to promote the common welfare, whether it does
in fact or not,”113 and does not appear to require the government to
justify its actions with scientific, epidemiologic, or medical
107. Commonwealth. v. Pear, 66 N.E. 719, 721−22 (Mass. 1903), aff’d, Jacobson, 197 U.S. 11.
Deferential treatment to public health agencies was typical of state courts’ treatment of mandatory
vaccination laws. See, e.g., Blue v. Beach, 56 N.E. 89, 91 (Ind. 1900) (holding courts have no concern
as to the effectiveness of the smallpox vaccine); Morris v. City of Columbus, 30 S.E. 850, 851–52 (Ga.
1898) (holding that the right to compel vaccination is based on necessity, and outbreak nearby towns
justified compelling vaccinations); Bissel v. Davison, 32 A. 348, 349−50 (Conn. 1894) (permitting
public schools to require vaccination as a prerequisite for admission).
108. See GOSTIN, POWER, supra note 7, at 130 (noting that federal and state courts have consistently
affirmed Jacobson’s holding and reasoning, and that it endures as a reasonable formulation of the
boundaries between individual and collective interests).
109. See id. at 126–28. Since Jacobson, the Supreme Court upheld regulations of food, milk, and
sanitation on the same principle. GOSTIN, POWER, supra note 7, at 126.
110. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 28.
111. Id. (emphasis added).
112. GOSTIN, POWER, supra note 7, at 127.
113. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 35 (quoting Viemeister v. White, 72 N.E. 97 (N.Y. 1904)).
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evidence.114 Courts have emphasized that deference must be given to
the legislature in making the determinations of what is necessary to
reach a public health objective.115
2. Proportionality
Additionally, public health officials cannot overreach in ways that
invade personal autonomy unnecessarily.116 Although the police
powers may be used to promote public health in a manner that
burdens individuals, the Court held that a regulation is
unconstitutional if it imposes a harm that is disproportionate to the
benefit expected.117 This creates a “balancing test” between the
public good and the degree of intervention.118
3. Harm Avoidance
Further, Justice Harlan emphasized that Jacobson would not be
injured or harmed by the immunization,119 but if a public health
114. GOSTIN, POWER, supra note 7, at 559–60 n.48. Nonetheless, Wendy E. Parmet points out that
“the Court’s opinion contained extensive citations to historical and statistical data . . . . Thus, the Court
effectively endorsed the use of epidemiological evidence to determine the appropriateness of the state’s
action.” PARMET, POPULATIONS supra note 25, at 39–40.
115. S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 190–91 (1938) (holding that
when a legislative action is within the police power “fairly debatable questions as to its reasonableness,
wisdom, and propriety are not for the determination of courts, but for the legislative body”). Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, in her Burwell dissent, appears to defer to the legislative findings in determining
whether the contraceptive mandate is a public health need. See Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2788 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
116. GOSTIN, POWER, supra note 7, at 127 (“Public health authorities have a constitutional
responsibility not to overreach in ways that unnecessarily invade personal spheres of autonomy.”).
117. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 38 (holding that the police powers exercised by legislature or local elected
officials “may be exerted in such circumstances, or by regulations so arbitrary and oppressive in
particular cases, as to justify the interference of the courts to prevent wrong and oppression.”).
118. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (noting that Jacobson “balanced
an individual’s liberty” against the “State’s interest in preventing disease”); Bates v. City of Little Rock,
361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960) (holding that only a “compelling” state interest justifies “significant
encroachment upon personal liberty”).
119. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 36–37. Although Jacobson offered to prove that vaccination can cause
injury or death and the results of a vaccination were not always certain, Justice Harlan dismissed these
claims because Jacobson did not prove that “he was in fact not a fit subject of vaccination . . . .” Id. The
obvious inference from Justice Harlan’s reasoning is that if one could show that a public health
intervention would cause an individual actual harm the intervention may be beyond the scope of
governmental authority. GOSTIN, POWER, supra note 7, at 127. The court, in fact, clarified that the
holding was limited to a subject who is “perfect[ly] health[y] and a fit subject of vaccination,” but was
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intervention would cause serious harm to its subject, it would not
pass constitutional muster. 120 Subsequent lower court cases reiterated
this condition, emphasizing that public health powers are designed to
promote the common good and not punish individuals.121
4. Fairness
Two previous cases in the same time period added a new
requirement: fairness.122 In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court
struck down a San Francisco ordinance prohibiting clothes-washing
in wooden buildings, because it was discriminatorily enforced against
Chinese owners.123 Similarly, in Jew Ho v. Williamson, public health
authorities in San Francisco quarantined an entire district known as
Chinatown due to an outbreak of bubonic plague, yet only enforced
the quarantine against people of Chinese nationality.124 The district
court held the intervention unconstitutional because it was enforced
with “an evil eye and an unequal hand.”125
5. Reasonable Means
The last requirement of the Jacobson court is that a public health
agency, when acting in response to a threat, may only use methods
that have a “substantial relation” to ameliorating the harm, and those
means cannot be “a plain, palpable invasion of rights.”126 This creates
a means/ends test, requiring a reasonable relationship between the
not addressing the issue of one for whom vaccination would “seriously impair his health, or probably
cause his death.” Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 39.
120. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 39 (clarifying that the court was not holding that an absolute rule requiring
vaccination regardless of the fitness of the subject would be constitutional).
121. GOSTIN, POWER, supra note 7, at 128. See, e.g., Kirk v. Wyman, 83 S.E. 387, 391 (S.C. 1909)
(holding public health authorities are required to provide safe and habitable conditions to individuals in
isolation).
122. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10, 12–13 (N.D. Cal.
1900); Gostin, Public’s Health, supra note 66, at 128 (adding the “fairness” requirement to public health
analysis based on these cases).
123. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373–74 (finding law banning laundries in wooden buildings targeted at the
Chinese population unconstitutional because the law was applied in an “unequal and oppressive” way
and were enacted to close down Chinese business).
124. Jew Ho, 103 F. at 12–13.
125. Id. at 23.
126. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905).

Published by Reading Room, 2015

21

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 4

634

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:3

intervention and the objective.127 This requirement has garnered
much debate in modern public health law, focusing on how direct the
causation must be between the means and the end.128
D. Standard of Review: Smith and the Religious Freedom and
Restoration Act
Although the Jacobson Court established the framework to
determine whether a public health interest is an appropriate use of
government power, modern day jurisprudence requires an additional
consideration: standard of review.129 Focusing on the reasonable
means test described above, the outcome of a modern-day challenge
to a public health initiative will depend greatly on the standard of
review.130 In other words, if the standard of review requires a
compelling interest, a public health initiative may not stand, even if
the government was acting to advance a valid aim.131
The contraceptive mandate implicates religious freedom concerns,
so a discussion of First Amendment Free Exercise doctrine is crucial
to determine its appropriateness.132 In a 1990 case, Employment Div.
127. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 510–11 (1934) (“[T]he guaranty of due process, as has often
been held, demands . . . the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought
to be attained.”); Cal. Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.S. 306, 318–19 (1905) (citing
Jacobson for the notion that courts should not strike down a regulation that has a “real, substantial
relation” to the objective trying to be reached).
128. See Hall, supra note 3, at S207 (arguing against the belief that public health can tackle issues
because that moves the discipline beyond the “pathogenic model” which targets specific agents that
threaten health in “a direct and clear causal path”). For example, mandatory seat belt use is only justified
because there is a “discrete intervention whose effectiveness is beyond dispute.” Id. at S208.
129. GOSTIN, POWER, supra note 7, at 138 (2nd ed. 2008) (indicating that the level of review will
dictate how the court balances competing interests and how much deference the court gives to public
health legislation).
130. Id. at 128.
131. Id. at 141 (explaining that under strict scrutiny, a government entity must show a “compelling
interest . . . between means and ends” and that there were no less restrictive means). Some of the
Jacobson criteria are included into the strict scrutiny test but only create a floor for court scrutiny. Id.
132. See Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 724
F.3d 377, 407–15 (3rd Cir. 2013) (Jordan, J., dissenting); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723
F.3d 1114, 1143–45 (10th Cir. 2013). While the main controversy in these cases surrounds whether a
corporate entity may or may not assert a religious freedom claim, a sub-issue in the cases is whether the
public health interests are sufficiently compelling. See Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 407–15 (Jordan, J.,
dissenting); Hobby Lobby Stores, 723 F.3d at 1143–45. A resolution of this sub-issue may affect future
public health legislation even if the Supreme Court were to find that a corporation cannot assert a free
exercise claim.
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v. Smith,133 the Supreme Court modified free-exercise jurisprudence
and ruled that “neutral laws of general applicability” that are
otherwise valid exercises of a state’s police powers are constitutional,
and an individual is not relieved from complying with them.134 The
Court rejected the use of strict scrutiny for general, neutral laws135
and embraced a “rational basis” test on actions burdening religion.136
In response to Smith, Congress passed the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).137 The purpose of the Act was to
restore the “compelling interest” test that the Court expressly rejected
in Smith.138 The Act imposes a two-part test in assessing a rule of
general applicability: (1) it must further a compelling interest and (2)
it must use the least restrictive means to do so.139 Although the
Supreme Court has held RFRA to be unconstitutional when applied
to state and local government,140 the Court has applied RFRA to rule
in favor of religious freedom in at least one case against the federal
government: Gonzales v. O Centro Esprita Beneficente Uniao do
Vegetal.141 This strict scrutiny standard requires the federal
133. 494 U.S. 872, 872 (1990).
134. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 901 (1990); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, 1303 (4th ed. 2011) (stating that Smith expressly
changed the law). The case centered around Alfred Smith and Galen Black, Native Americans in
Oregon, who challenged an Oregon statute prohibiting use of “peyote,” a “controlled substance,” which
they used for ritual purposes. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874. Conviction caused them to lose employment and
unemployment benefits. Id.
135. Smith, 494 U.S. at 888. The court distinguished previous free exercise challenges that seemed to
point the other direction because all those cases involved a synthesis of claims, whereas Smith involved
only a free exercise claim. Id.
136. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 134, at 1304.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012).
138. Id. at (b)(1) (declaring the purpose of the statute to “restore the compelling interest test as set
forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) . . . .”).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2012).
140. Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997) (finding the RFRA unconstitutional). The city of
Boerne, Texas denied a building permit to a Catholic Church because it was deemed a historic
landmark. Id. at 512. The church challenged the ordinance designating the area a historic district under
the RFRA. Id.
141. See generally Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
A religious sect that used a controlled substance to make a ritual tea challenged the Controlled
Substances Act under the RFRA. Id. at 418. The court applied strict scrutiny to rule in favor of the
religious group. Id. at 419–20. Specifically, the court found that “mere invocation of the general
characteristics” is insufficient. Id. at 420. Although the court did not specifically address the
constitutionality of the act in the context of the federal government, the unanimous ruling relied on its
validity. Id. at 419–20.
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government to show a “tight relationship between means and ends”
and that there is no less restrictive means when advancing a public
health initiative that intrudes on religious freedom.142 Also, the Court
held that the government must go beyond “mere invocation of the
general characteristics” and must “show with more particularity” how
an even strong interest is adversely affected by a religious
exemption.143
In sum, according to the Jacobson framework of public health
analysis, five questions should be asked: (1) Does the public good
outweigh the invasion into personal autonomy?144 (2) Is the
government initiative “necessary for the safety of the public”?145 (3)
Does the action cause significant harm to the individual?146 (4) Was
the initiative adopted in a way that reflects “an evil eye and an
unequal hand”?147 (5) Does the legislation represent the most
reasonable means by which to accomplish the goal?148 Under this
framework, arguments for or against a government public health
measure must focus on clear public health legal doctrine.149 A lack of
analytical framework lends itself to speculation not grounded in facts
or statistical analysis and does not provide judges with a way to
evaluate public health initiatives.150 Much of the decision-making is
in danger of being left to policy-based or political discretion. Rather
than assuming away the issue, Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, or Justice
Alito could have made strong arguments against the compelling
interest of the contraceptive mandate.
142. GOSTIN, POWER, supra note 7, at 141.
143. O Centro, 546 U.S. at 431–32 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 236 (1972)).
144. See supra Part III.C.2.
145. See supra Part III.C.1.
146. See supra Part III.C.3.
147. See supra Part III.C.4.
148. See supra Part III.C.5.
149. See Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 686 (7th Cir. 2013). The courts, in fact, seemed to imply
that if the Obama administration would have engaged in a more rigorous public health argument,
perhaps a compelling interest would have been found. See id. (stating that the issue is “contestable and
contested” and the government was guaranteed to “flunk the test” because they stated the aims to
broadly).
150. See, e.g., Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 733 F.3d 1208, 1220 (D.C. Cir.
2013). In fact, in Gilardi, the majority opinion holds that a compelling scientific public health interest is
not present; whereas, the dissent claims that the mandate “obviously serves the compelling interests of
promoting public health, welfare, and gender equality.” Id. at 1220, at 1239.
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IV. IS THE MANDATE REALLY COMPELLING? WHAT THE COURT
COULD HAVE FOUND
In most contexts, the public health doctrine requires courts to
balance the harms of an action against the expected benefits.151
However, when legislation implicates religious freedom, the RFRA
statutorily requires more than just proportionality: it requires a
“compelling interest.”152 With regard to the contraceptive mandate,
three of the lower courts found that it does not promote a compelling
government interest as required by the RFRA as interpreted in O
Centro.153 In Burwell, the Supreme Court appears to agree.154 The
Court said that RFRA requires a “more focused” inquiry, and HHS
only asserted “very broadly framed interests.”155 The Court did not,
however, engage in a rigorous public health legal analysis but
preferred to assume away this issue and decide the case on other
grounds.156 Had the Court analyzed the issue through the lens of the
Jacobson factors presented above,157 perhaps it would have revealed

151. See supra Part III.C.2.
152. See supra Part III.D.
153. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 544 U.S. 418 (2006); Korte v.
Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 686 (7th Cir. 2013); Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1220; Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v.
Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1142 (10th Cir. 2013). In Hobby Lobby Stores, the court held that the
government’s interest to promote public health and inequality were too broadly formulated to withstand
a compelling interest test. Hobby Lobby Stores, 723 F.3d at 1143. Similarly, in Gilardi, the court held
the government merely recited public health justifications that were “sketchy and highly abstract.”
Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1220. Lastly, in Korte, the court found that the governmental interests were stated
“at such a high level of generality” that “the government guarantees that the mandate will flunk the
test.” Korte, 735 F.3d at 686.
154. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779 (2014). See also id. at 2800
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that even the majority opinion “stepp[ed] back from its assumption
that compelling interests support the contraceptive coverage requirement”).
155. Id. at 2779.
156. Id. at 2780. See Epstein, supra note 24, at 51 (criticizing Justice Samuel Alito’s Burwell decision
for assuming “that the advancement of ‘women’s health’ was a compelling state interest that warranted
the imposition of the contraceptive mandate against Hobby Lobby”). The lower courts did not assume
the issue. For example, the Gilardi court appears to analyze the public health claims but does not utilize
any sort of legal framework in doing so. Gilardi, 732 F.3d at 1220. Rather, it asserts that the
government’s failure to acknowledge the “tug-of-war” of scientific evidence “gives us pause.” Id. at
1221. In Korte, the court asserts that the lack of evidence as to the least restrictive means implies that “it
is nearly impossible” to justify the public health interests but does not engage in analysis of the public
health aims. Korte, 735 F.3d at 686.
157. See supra Part III.C.
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that the contraceptive mandate is not as compelling as its proponents
make it seem.158
When applying judicial scrutiny, the court will uphold a neutral
law of general applicability even if it burdens certain religious
groups’ practices.159 As long as the religious group is not targeted for
punishment or motivated by a desire to interfere with religion, the
law is constitutional.160 In a similar vein, the Wick-Ho requirement of
fairness is only transgressed if the law is designed to specifically
target a racial or religious group or is only enforced against one of
these groups.161 The mandate, therefore, cannot be attacked for being
applied in a discriminatory fashion. Although religious groups may
be adversely affected by it, the law applies to all for-profit employers
without distinction.162
Nonetheless, the mandate is not “necessary” in the legal sense of
the term. In the classic construct of public health doctrine,
government is only entitled to act in the “face of a demonstrable
health threat” and even then may only able to do what is necessary
for the safety of the public.163 The Jacobson Court likely did not
envision the broad view that many scholars would eventually take of
public health because the doctrine at that time focused only on
addressing immediate health threats.164
In the context of the contraceptive mandate, the supporters show
some connection between contraceptive coverage and a decrease in
unwanted pregnancies, but they hardly show a “necessity.”165 First,
158. See Epstein, supra note 24, at 51–53.
159. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (upholding a neutral ban
on peyote even though the hallucinogenic substance was required by Native Americans for religious
reasons because it was a rule of “general applicability”).
160. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531–32 (1993) (declaring a
city ordinance banning ritual sacrifice unconstitutional because it was enacted with the purpose of
restricted religious practice).
161. See supra Part III.C.4.
162. See 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(B) (2013) (carving out religious exemption only for non-profit
religious institutions).
163. See supra Part III.C.1; GOSTIN, POWER, supra note 7, at 127.
164. See Epstein, supra note 5, at 1425 (describing the original, more limited view of public health).
Similarly, “[t]he global interest in public health and safety may justify the general control of the street
and commercial use of drugs under the Controlled Substances Act, but it hardly justifies the restriction
as it applies to the ingestion of peyote as part of a religious rite.” Epstein, supra note 24, at 52.
165. See supra Part I.A.2.
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as opponents point out, contraception is readily available through
various government programs and yet it is still considered a public
health crisis.166 Arguably the issue is not the availability of
contraceptive methods but rather a dearth in education on
contraception use and responsible sexual behavior. Second, the
provision of free contraception through employer-based insurance
may not be compelling because there are other ways of affecting a
decrease in unwanted pregnancies such as tax deductions for
contraceptive purchases, expansion of federal programs under
Medicaid or Title X of the Public Health Services Act, government
reimbursement for contraception, or incentives for drug companies to
provide contraceptives to healthcare providers free of charge.167
Lastly, leaving the religiously controversial contraceptives out of the
mandate would not frustrate the larger goals because those who do
not oppose all forms of contraception could still provide forms they
hold permissible.168 Therefore, it is difficult to argue that forcing
businesses to provide the three controversial methods is necessary.
Further, the government can only enforce a public health initiative
if the methods used substantially relate to the aim the government
attempts to achieve.169 Therefore, in assessing an initiative, courts
look for a strong causative nexus between the action being
undertaken and the harm the government attempts to ameliorate.170
The contraceptive mandate claims to achieve a decrease in unwanted
pregnancies and a corresponding increase the health of families and

166. See supra note 53.
167. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2781–82 (2014); Conestoga Wood
Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 414 (3rd Cir. 2013)
(Jordan, J., dissenting) (quoting Appellant’s Brief at 51); Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 733 F.3d 1208, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 2013). The government did not assert why any of these options
would be unworkable. Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 415. Although these considerations go to the last prong of
the test—the “least restrictive means”—they may also show of a lack of necessity in creating a
compelling interest for a contraceptive mandate. See Epstein, supra note 24, at 52–53.
168. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1144 (10th Cir. 2013). This argument may
not satisfy some religious objectors who believe every form of contraception is prohibited.
169. See supra Part III.C.5.
170. Id.
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mothers.171 Unfortunately, it falls short of achieving the desired
nexus.172
First, even though the IOM report claims that access to
contraception will improve family health, statistical evidence falls
short of proving causation between contraceptive coverage and a
decrease in unwanted pregnancies.173 Second, even assuming that
there is a relation between contraceptive coverage and unwanted
pregnancy, no causation is apparent between a decrease in unwanted
pregnancy and improved family health.174 The report merely
demonstrates a correlative relationship.175 As opponents argue,
predisposition to risk-taking may account for both increased
instances of unwanted pregnancy and other health conditions such as
smoking, drinking, and obtaining substandard medical care for
children.176 Perhaps the Court would have been more willing to let
the mandate stand if HHS had shown that it relied on stronger
scientific or epidemiological sources than the IOM report in
fashioning the mandate or if the IOM based its report on stronger
evidence showing a causative nexus. But, because that was not
possible, the Court could not have found a compelling interest to
exist.
Further, in the issue before the Jacobson Court, the focus was on
the physical harm that a public health action could inflict on
individuals.177 One of the underlying principles in the Jacobson
decision is that public health initiatives should be designed to
promote the common good and not to punish individuals.178 As the
Court points out, from the perspective of religious individuals, the
contraceptive mandate could cause catastrophic harm.179 Although
the business owners are not being forced to actually take the
171. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
172. See Gilardi, 732 F.3d at 1220 (“But the government does little to demonstrate a nexus between
this array of issues and the mandate.”).
173. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
177. See supra Part III.C.3.
178. See supra Part III.C.3.
179. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775–76 (2014).
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contraceptives, the Gilardi court notes that according to Catholic
doctrine, “instructing or encouraging someone else to commit a
wrongful act is itself a grave moral wrong—i.e., ‘scandal’—under
Catholic doctrine,” and “the Mandate thrusts Catholic employers into
a ‘perfect storm’ of moral complicity in the forbidden actions.”180
Although the Burwell dissent takes the position that “the connection
between the families’ religious objections and the contraceptive
coverage requirement is too attenuated to rank as substantial,”181 the
majority strongly argues that such an inquiry is irrelevant.182 RFRA
asks the court to answer whether the mandate imposes a substantial
burden on “their religious beliefs” and not to question whether those
sincerely held beliefs are right or wrong.183 It is not the place of the
courts to speculate as to the “moral responsibility” of a sin, but rather
the court must be sensitive the religious beliefs of the individual.184
Additionally, the mandate imposes such a heavy fine on businesses
that cannot comply because of their religious beliefs that it
effectively puts religious business owners in an impossible situation
where they are forced to choose between violating their religious
convictions and facing irreparable harm.185 Alternatively, in cases
like Burwell, the mandate would force a religious individual to make
a choice as to which religious belief he will follow.186 Although the
purpose of the penalty is to incentivize compliance, it effectively
punishes religious business owners who cannot, in good conscience,

180. Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 733 F.3d 1208, 1215 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
(quoting Br. of Catholic Theologians at 3, 5).
181. Burwell, 124 S. Ct. at 2799. The dissent argues that the “requirement carries no command that
Hobby Lobby or Conestoga purchase or provide the contraceptives they find objectionable. Instead, it
calls on the companies . . . to direct money into undifferentiated funds that finance a wide variety of
benefits under comprehensive health plans.” Id.
182. Id. at 2778.
183. Id.
184. Gilardi, 732 F.3d at 1215 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 n. 12 (1982)).
185. See 26 U.S.C.A § 4980D(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-125 (excluding P.L. 113-121))
(imposing a tax of “$100 for each day in the noncompliance period with respect to each individual to
whom such failure relates”); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1146–47 (10th Cir.
2013) (describing the business owner’s predicament as a “Hobson’s choice”).
186. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2776–77 (noting that the companies were religiously obliged to provide
health insurance to their employees, and asking them to not provide health insurance at all would be a
violation of their religion).
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comply. This Hobson’s choice is precisely the sort of religious
freedom RFRA is designed to protect.
CONCLUSION
Public health law remains a hotly debated subject, socially and
politically charged from both right and left. In its attempt to provide
proper preventative healthcare, the Obama Administration
overstepped its bounds with the HHS Mandate, representing a classic
case of government overreach into the religious liberty of its citizens.
The Administration disguised the Mandate as a public health
initiative. Nonetheless, it failed to provide concrete justification for
the invasion on individual liberty, indicating that the purpose was
less to promote the common good and more to advance a political or
social agenda at the expense of religious freedom.
The judicial system is tasked with developing an objective
framework based on judicial precedent to evaluate public health
initiatives. This framework provides proponents with a predictable
framework with which they can advocate their cause and religious
and social minorities with the necessary tools to defend themselves
against inappropriate government coercion. Although the Supreme
Court in Burwell chose not to provide that framework, a return to the
Jacobson paradigm would provide that direction.
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